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Policy Preference Change and
Appointments to the
Supreme Court of Canada
BENJAMIN ALARIE* & ANDREW GREEN**
Canadian prime ministers appoint judges to the Supreme Court of Canada at their own
discretion. This practice has been criticized'as providing prime ministers with the ability to
appoint judges whose policy preferences are regarded as politically congenial. We examine
the Court's judgments in the post- Charterera to discern the apparent policy preferences of
the judges. Our results suggest that the policy preferences of judges are not strongly asso-
ciated with the political party of the prime minister and that their policy preferences shift
over time in seemingly unpredictabte ways. We discuss the implications of this analysis for
possible reforms of the appointments process.
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IS IT PROBLEMATIC THAT APPOINTMENTS to important judicial posts, including
appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada, have historically been made
entirely at the discretion of the prime minister? On the basis of an empirical
analysis of the judgments of the Supreme Court from 1982 to the 2004 term,
we argue that, to date, it has not been terribly problematic. We propose that,
although the current appointments process for Supreme Court judges may be
in need of reform to prevent possible future abuses, any such reform must re-
main mindful of the famous Hippocratic dictum that, in treating a patient, one
should be careful to "do no harm."'
Perhaps it should not be too surprising that the evidence shows that the ju-
dicial appointments process to the Supreme Court has been satisfactory. For
much of Canada's history, the power to make judicial appointments was not
regarded as a particularly important one. However, with the advent of the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms' in 1982, the role of the judiciary has become more overtly
I. Hippocrates, Of the Epidemics, trans. by Francis Adams (400 BCE), Section II, Second
Constitution at para. 5, online: The Internet Classics Archive <http://classics.mit.edu/
Hippocrates/epidemics. 1 .i.html>. The precise words are: "[t]he physician must be able to tell
the antecedents, know the present, and foretell the future-must mediate these things, and
have two special objects in view with regard to disease, namely, to do good or to do no harm.
The art consists in three things-the disease, the patient, and the physician. The physician is
the servant of the art, and the patient must combat the disease along with the physician."
2. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
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politicized. Some critics of the post-Charter era judiciary have objected to the
actions of "activist" judges, who they characterize as making social policy for
the country on the basis of liberMl agendas. The harshest of these criticisms have
been reserved for the judges of the Supreme Court.3 Defenders of Canada's
judiciary, on the other hand, argue that the judges did not arrogate to themselves
the duty to enforce and interpret constitutionally-entrenched Charter rights.
Instead, the courts are seen as merely fulfilling their role in ensuring that gov-
ernments at all levels comply with the Canadian constitution.
Predictably, the greater role that our courts, including the Supreme Court,
have taken in reviewing government action has led to a higher public profile for
the judiciary. This higher profile has, in turn, led to greater public scrutiny of
judicial appointments in general, and appointments to the Supreme Court in
particular. Calls for a reformed appointments process have been recurrent.'
These calls have resulted in some modest changes, though the power to make
appointments (not simply to nominate judges, as in the United States) continues
to reside ultimately with the prime minister.6 Thus far, calls for an American
nomination and formal legislative vetting process have been unsuccessful. How-
ever, in the medium- to long-term, it may be, as recent Supreme Court appointee
3. See e.g. F.L. Morton & Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party
(Peterborough: Broadview Press, 2000). Morton and Knopff claim that the Supreme Court
"sees itself as the authoritative oracle of the constitution" (at 54). Later, they write: "[a]
people prepared to treat political opponents as legitimate surely needs to make government
by discussion a leading means of settling political differences. To the extent that the Charter
represents a flight from this kind of politics, it can be understood as threatening rather than
promoting the unity necessary to a sovereign people" (at 150).
4. "Neo-conservative critics condemn Charter interpretation as the judicial imposition of naked
preferences. Yet judicial interpretation is firmly grounded in the Charter's text and political
history and Canada's institutional structure and postwar social model. The critics reserve their
praise for judges who do exactly what they decry-impose their own personal, conservative
values not found in the Charter." Lorraine Weinrib, "The Activist Constitution" (April 1999)
Policy Options 27 at 27.
5. See e.g. Allan Hutchinson, "Let's try democracy when choosing top judges" The Globe
andMail (3 March 2004) A19. See generally Martin L. Friedland, A Place Apart: Judicial
Independence and Accountability in Canada (Ottawa: Canadian Judicial Council, 1995).
6. See Part II for a discussion of the appointments process. For a detailed treatment of the
appointments processes throughout Canada, including both federal and provincial
appointments, see Richard Devlin, A. Wayne MacKay & Natasha Kim, "Reducing the
Democratic Deficit: Representation, Diversity and the Canadian Judiciary, or Towards a
'Triple P' Judiciary" (2000) 38 Alta. L. Rev. 734.
4 (20091 47 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Marshall Rothstein contends, that "the genie is out of the bottle." He is doubtful,
moreover, that we will ever "go back to a less public process for Supreme Court
nominations."7
Nevertheless, it seems, at least for the moment, that the genie is back in the
bottle. Prime Minister Stephen Harper rushed to nominate Justice Thomas
Cromwell of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court on the eve
of the announcement that there would be a federal election called for 14 October
2008.8 The move bypassed the all-party parliamentary selection committee that
Prime Minister Harper himself had established earlier in the year to vet nominees
to the Court.9 Although the prime minister sidestepped the selection committee,
Justice Cromwell was initially expected to face an ad hoc all-party committee of
parliamentarians for questioning, just as Justice Marshall Rothstein did as a
nominee in 2006.10 However, in the end, the prime minister appointed him
without any such hearing."
7. Justice Marshall Rothstein was sworn into office as a justice of the Supreme Court on 9 March
2006. Justice Marshall Rothstein, "The Supreme Court Appointment Process" (2006-2007
David B. Goodman Lecture, delivered at the Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, 25
October 2006), at 31:54m of the streaming video, online: Information Commons, University
of Toronto <http://l42.150.64.63/20061025GoodmanLaw/index.htm>.
In a short period of time, we have come some distance from the traditional system in which
the prime minister unilaterally chose his nominee with no oversight process at all. ... Our
present prime minister and minister of justice indicated quite clearly before they were elected
to government their preference for a parliamentary hearing process at which the nominee would
be present to answer questions from the committee, and that is what transpired this time
around. ... Two things that moderated the process that I went through will never happen
again. The first was that I happened to be on the list of nominees of one government and
from which the new government selected its candidate. That coincidence will likely never
happen again. Second, the usual aggressiveness between the opposition and government had
not yet developed. The government was brand new and that coincidence will likely never
happen again. So a civil and productive process is not a guarantee for the future. But the genie is
out of the bottle. I don't think we will ever go back to a less public process for Supreme Court
nominations.
8. "Prime Minister Stephen Harper jettisoned his own selection panel made up of five MPs-
two Conservatives and one from each opposition party-to make the nomination a day
before announcing an election." Robert Todd, "Nova Scotia's Cromwell Nominated for
SCC" Law Times (15 September 2008), online: <http://www.lawtimesnews.com/Headline-
News/Nova-Scotias-Cromwell-nominated-for-SCC>.
9. Ibid. The establishment of the committee followed Justice Michel Bastarache's announcement
in early April 2008 that he would be leaving the Court.
10. Ibid.
11. Peter W. Hogg, "Appointment of Thomas A. Cromwell to the Supreme Court of Canada"
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Assuming that we do not permanently revert to a less public process for ap-
pointing future judges to the Supreme Court, the question becomes what sort of
public process it should be. In this article, we argue that several key assumptions
underlying the debate surrounding the appointments process remain insuffi-
ciently tested to empirically answer this question. Paramount among these is
that prime ministers can accurately predict how potential nominees will decide
ideologically divisive appeals. A fundamental and outstanding empirical issue for
those on both sides of the debate is that no one really knows how predictable
judicial attitudes are likely to be at the time of a judge's appointment.
In this article, we address the predictability of judicial voting through an
empirical analysis of Supreme Court judgments in the post-Charter era. We
examine how the policy preferences of the judges have shifted, if at all, between
1982 and 2004, focusing particular attention on the behaviour of judges immedi-
ately following their appointment. Our goal is to determine whether prime
ministers (or others) can predict how judges will decide future appeals. Predic-
tions may, for example, be inaccurate because preferences are not transparent
at the time of appointment, or because judges exhibit a random walk in their
voting patterns over time. If it is not possible to predict at the time of appoint-
ment how a judge will decide future appeals, then the ideologically-infused de-
bate surrounding appointments to the Court is over-emphasized, if not entirely
misplaced.
Part I of this article briefly describes the current appointments process for
judges of the Supreme Court and sets out the current debate about appropriate
reforms to this process. Part II describes our data set of decisions between 1982
and the end of the 2004 term. We then discuss the two methodologies used to
assess preference change among the judges of the Court. The first is a direct
methodology based on the observation of judicial votes in various areas of law.
The second is an indirect methodology using a Bayesian inference and a Markov
Chain Monte Carlo methodology to uncover the latent policy preferences of
the judges based on a spatial item-response theory model.'2 Our results are pre-
sented in Part III.
We begin by assuming that judges have constant preferences over their ten-
ure on the Court, after which we relax this assumption and assess the, conse-
(Paper presented to the 2008 Constitutional Cases Conference, Osgoode Hall Law School,
York University, 17 April 2009) [unpublished] [Hogg, "Cromwell"].
12. See Part II.C for a description of the indirect method.
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quences. Our results suggest that the policy preferences of judges do indeed shift
over time and, as we explain in Part IV, this shifting has significant implications
for both sides of the debate about Supreme Court appointments.
I. FRAMING THE JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS DEBATE IN
CANADA
A. THE CURRENT APPOINTMENTS PROCESS IN CANADA
Canadian political scientist Peter McCormick argues that the "modern" process
for appointments to the Supreme Court of Canada began in the 1970s."3 Before
then, appointments emphasized patronage and partisanship. Several judges were
politicians, or had strong personal connections to politicians, and most had little
or no prior judicial experience."4 Reforms began with Pierre Elliot Trudeau's
appointment as justice minister in 1967 and continued through his time as
prime minister. The Trudeau reforms expanded the process of generating lists
of nominees and introduced extensive consultations with legal professionals.
These reforms also placed a new emphasis on candidates' prior judicial experi-
ence, familiarity with the academic side of the law, and non-partisan public
service.
1 5
Before 2004, only sketchy details of the federal judicial appointments proc-
ess were made publicly available.1 6 Among others, the minister of justice would
consult with the chief justice of the Supreme Court, other Supreme Court
judges, provincial chief justices, attorneys general, Canadian Bar Association
officials, and law society officials.1 7 The prime minister would then choose a
nominee from a list resulting from these consultations that was prepared by
the minister of justice.
13. Peter McCormick, "Selecting the Supremes: The Appointment of Judges to the Supreme
Court of Canada" (2005) 7 J. App. Pr. & Pro. I [McCormick, "Selecting"].
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid. at 13-16.
16. Peter W. Hogg, "Appointment of Justice Marshall Rothstein to the Supreme Court of
Canada" (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall L.J. 527 at 528 [Hogg, "Rothstein"]. See also Devlin,
MacKay & Kim, supra note 6 at 763.
17. House of Commons, Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights, Public Safety and
Emergency Preparedness, Improving the Supreme Court of Canada Appointments Process (Ottawa:
Communication Canada, 2004), cited in McCormick, "Selecting," supra note 13 at 15.
ALARIE & GREEN, SUPREME COURT OF CANADA APPOINTMENTS 7
In 2004, then Justice Minister Irwin Cotler answered questions from the
Standing Committee on Justice of the House of Commons about the individuals
-Rosalie Abella and Louise Charron (both previously judges of the Ontario
Court of Appeal)-who had been nominated to the Supreme Court by Prime
Minister Paul Martin.18 The membership of this committee consisted of seven
members of Parliament, a Supreme Court judge, and a law society bencher. 9 The
committee had no power to veto or even delay appointments." This process ap-
pears, in retrospect, to have simply been an ad hoc attempt to provide the appear-
ance of some public scrutiny of the prime minister's selections for appointment.
In 2005, Prime Minister Martin added an advisory panel to the process.
The advisory panel consisted of one member of Parliament (MP) from each
political party, a retired judge, the attorney general from the relevant region, an
official from the relevant provincial law society, and two laypersons.21 Under this
new process, the minister of justice would create a list of eight nominees, from
which the panel would create a short list of three. The prime minister would
then appoint one of those three nominees from the list.22 It appears that once
an appointment was made, the minister of justice would again appear before a
parliamentary committee to answer questions regarding the prime minister's
selection. This process was interrupted by the federal election of 23 January 2006,
which was won by Stephen Harper's Conservative Party.
At the time of the election, the Supreme Court had one vacancy and the
advisory panel had generated its short list of three candidates. Instead of recom-
mencing the process, Prime Minister Harper decided to appoint one of the three
candidates from the short list. Rather than have the minister of justice appear
before a committee, the nominee appeared before a parliamentary committee in
a publicly-televised hearing. The committee's membership consisted of twelve
MPs, with each party represented in approximate proportion to its number of
seats in the House of Commons. The committee members could ask any ques-
18. Hogg, "Cromwell," supra note 11.
19. Cristin Schmitz, "New SCC Appointments Praised While Review Process Condemned" The
Lawyers Weekly 24:17 (10 September 2004).
20. Peter McCormick, "The Serendipitous Solution to the Problem of Supreme Court
Appointments" (2006) 44 Osgoode Hall L.J. 539 at 543 [McCormick, "Serendipitous"].
21. Jacob Ziegel, "A New Era in the Selection of Supreme Court Judges?" (2006) 44 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 547 at 553 [Ziegel, "New Era"].
22. Ibid.
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tions they wished, but the nominee was not obliged to answer them. Committee
members were advised ahead of time as to the sorts of questions the nominee
would and would not be willing to answer. The committee did not produce a
report and could not veto the appointment. The prime minister retained sole
discretion over the ultimate appointment and he appointed the nominee-
Marshall Rothstein.23
Thomas Cromwell's appointment in December of 2008 did not follow this
script, largely because Prime Minister Harper wanted to restore the Court to its
full complement as soon as possible, and because of fears that the fall 2008 elec-
tion would interfere with the process. The prime minister appointed- Cromwell
without a hearing. This bypassing of the public process makes it unclear how
appointments will be made in the future. In this instance, it appears that Prime
Minister Harper was frustrated by the slow-moving selection panel, which was
composed of two Conservative Party MPs as well as one MP from each of the
opposition parties. According to Justice Minister Rob Nicholson, in the month
leading up to Cromwell's nomination, the selection panel "didn't get anything
done because the opposition had objections to the composition of the commit-
tee," and "this month, a couple days of teleconferences had-to be cancelled be-
cause no members of the opposition were available." 2
The process that will be used for future Supreme Court of Canada appoint-
ments, the next of which is not due to happen until 2013,2" is unclear given the
shifting procedures that have accompanied the last few appointments. However,
the following is a thumbnail sketch that is consistent with what appears to be
the current process:
" Following extensive informal consultations, the minister of justice will create a list
of eight nominees.
" An all-party parliamentary selection panel will narrow the minister of justice's list
to a short list of three candidates.
" The prime minister will nominate one of the three candidates.
" The nominee will appear at a publicly-televised hearing before an all-party par-
liamentary committee.
" The prime minister will make the final decision whether to appoint the nominee.
23. Hogg, "Rothstein," supra note 16 at 529-30.
24. As quoted by John Ward, "Harper nominates Nova Scotian to Supreme Court" The Globe
and Mail (5 September 2008) [on file with the Osgoode Hall L.J.].
25. Justices of the Supreme Court of Canada must retire at the age of seventy-five. Supreme
CourtAct, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 9(2).
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It should be noted that there is a statutory requirement that at least three of
the nine judges on the Supreme Court must be from the province of Quebec.2"
Although there is no formal requirement, the convention is that three of the
remaining judges will be appointed from Ontario, two will be drawn from the
western provinces (British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba),
and one will be selected from the eastern provinces (New Brunswick, Nova
Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland). The current practice is that,
as judges retire, they are replaced with judges from the same geographical area.
B. THE DEBATE OVER THE APPOINTMENTS PROCESS
Academics and newspaper editorialists have debated the merits of public hearings
for judicial nominees at length. Opponents fear that the hearings will undermine
judicial independence by forcing judges to defend their decisions and ideologies
to the members of the legislature." Opponents also suggest that the current
appointments process, for all its flaws, is non-partisan, and that televised hear-
ings would only politicize it, weakening public confidence in the Court and its
judges.28 They also claim that strong candidates may refuse appointments to
avoid putting their personal lives before a national audience.29 Finally, opponents
argue that problems with the appointments process are better resolved before,
not after, nominations are made. For example, an independent commission
could generate a short list of nominees, from which the prime minister might
be compelled to choose. That way, appointments could be made more trans-
parent and accountable without sacrificing judicial independence."
Supporters of public' hearings, on the other hand, claim that they are an
excellent way to make appointments transparent. Democratic values, they argue,
26. Ibid., s. 6. "At least three of the judges shall be appointed from among the judges of the
Court of Appeal or of the Superior Court of the Province of Quebec or from among the
advocates of that Province."
27. See e.g. Kent Roach, "Supreme Court of Canada Appointments and Judicial Independence"
(2004) 48 Crim. L.Q. 397 at 398; Lorne B. Neud6rf, "Independence and the Public Process:
Evolution or Erosion?" (2007) 70 Sask. L. Rev. 53 at 86; and Adam M. Dodek & Lorne
Sossin, eds., The Future ofjudiciallndependence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press)
[forthcoming].
28. The Honourable Michael J. Bryant, "Judging the Judges: Judicial Independence and Reforms
to the Supreme Court of Canada Appointment Process" (2004) 24 S.C.L.R. (2d) 29.
29. McCormick, "Selecting," supra note 13 at 33.
30. See e.g. Roach, supra note 27; Bryant, supra note 28; and ibid.
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demand public scrutiny of nominees in light of the important role played by
the judges of the Supreme Court in influencing social policy specifically, and
public policy more generally.3 Hearings can also help to educate Canadians
about the role of the judiciary in our legal system.32 Supporters argue that hear-
ings will not politicize the process, but will only bring the politics of appoint-
ments out of backrooms and into the public eye.33 Supporters also reject the
argument that hearings threaten judicial independence. So long as hearings are
properly regulated, nominees will not be subject to the types of questions that
might compromise their integrity. " Most fundamentally, they argue, hearings
will prevent prime ministers from appointing judges on a purely partisan basis.35
Academics on both sides of the debate seem to agree that the pre-200 4
judicial appointments process should be changed. The arguments in favour
of change involve, among others, the benefits of transparency, especially given
the enormous power of Supreme Court justices to create law and decide pol-
icy.36 Political scientist Peter McCormick, for example, argues that the public
should know who was consulted in generating nominee lists, what qualities
were emphasized in candidates, and what led the prime minister to choose the
particular appointee.37 Law professor Jacob Ziegel similarly argues that Canadians
31. Jacob S. Ziegel, Address (Presented to the Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights,
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, 23 March 2004), cited in Neudorf, supra note 27 at
71-72 [Ziegel, Address]; Angie Mohr, "Judging Canada's judges; view from the Right: We de-
serve to know powerful justices better" The Record [Kitchener-Waterloo] (25 February 2006) Al 5.
32. Mohr, ibid.; Ziegel, "New Era," supra note 21 at 554.
33. Ted Morton, Address (Presented to the Standing Committee on Justice, Human Rights,
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, 1 April 2004), cited in Neudorf, supra note 27 at
74; Grant Huscroft, "Judicial reform inevitable" Toronto Star (22 February 2006) A17; and
Mindelle Jacobs, "Winds of Judicial Change in the Air" Edmonton Sun (23 February 2006)
11 (Editorial/Opinion).
34. Ziegel, "New Era," supra note 21 at 553; Hogg, "Rothstein," supra note 16 at 528.
35. Ted Byfield, "Courting Change" Calgary Sun (24 February 2006) 14 (Editorial/Opinion);
Ted Byfield, "Harper Thinks We're Running a Democracy" Calgary Sun (7 September
2003) C3.
36. This brings to mind the observation made by Louis D. Brandeis (before he became a judge
on the US Supreme Court): "[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most
efficient policeman." Louis D. Brandeis, Other People's Money and How the Bankers Use It
(New York: McClure Publications, 1914) at 92.
37. McCormick, "Selecting," supra note 13 at 16.
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are suspicious of closed-door deliberations38 and claims that making Supreme
Court appointments behind closed doors is inconsistent with due process and
the rule of law.39
A related concern is the possibility of political appointments. Some writers
characterize the current system as partisan, arguing that this can be discouraged
by a more transparent process." Others believe that partisan appointments do
not occur, but are possible, and Canadians know it. They argue that transpar-
ency would improve public confidence in the justice system.4 1
Fuelling the debate over the transparency issue in Canada are the perceived
shortcomings of the appointments process to the US Supreme Court, which
requires the Senate to confirm the president's nominee. Under the US Consti-
tution," the president "shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, shall appoint ... judges of the Supreme Court. 43 Presidents engage
in extensive consultations before nominating a candidate and conduct a thorough
investigation of their nominees. Once nominated, a candidate is considered by
the Senate Judiciary Committee. The Committee makes its own investigation
and conducts a public hearing at which the nominee testifies. The Committee
reports its recommendation to the Senate, which debates and votes on the con-
firmation. If the vote succeeds, the appointment is confirmed.
Supporters of hearings in Canada note that Marshall Rothstein's hearing
was calm and civilized, so hearings need not become American-style circuses."
A number of commentators, however, have proposed an independent advisory
commission as an alternative to hearings. 5 The commission would generate a
list of nominees from which the prime minister would choose. In some versions,
it would be apolitical with no MPs sitting on the commission. Depending on
38. Ziegel, "New Era," supra note 21 at 555.
39. Ziegel, Address, supra note 31 at 71-72.
40. See e.g. Ziegel, "New Era," supra note 21 at 551.
41. See e.g. Hogg, "Rothstein," supra note 16 at 533-34; Roach, supra note 27 at 397.
42. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
43. Ibid. For an overview of the US appointments process, see Denis Steven Rutkus, "Supreme
Court Appointment Process: Roles of the President, Judiciary Committee, and Senate"
(Library of Congress, 2005), online: US Department of State <http://fpc.state.gov/documents
organization/50146.pdf>.
44. Ziegell "New Era," supra note 21 at 548-49.
45. See e.g. McCormick, "Selecting," supra note 13; Roach, supra note 27; and Bryant, supra note 28.
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the openness of the process, proponents argue that such a commission could
create a transparent public process for nominations with the appearance of
impartiality. By generating nominations, the commission has more power than
a committee, which can only accept or reject a chosen candidate. Furthermore,
since legislatures would be left out of the process entirely, judicial independence
would not be compromised. The main criticism of this proposal is that it might
result in "safe" appointments on which the entire committee (or a super-majority
of the committee) could agree. Controversial judges would be excluded, even if,
like former Chief Justice Bora Laskin, they may have a stronger, positive impact
on Canadian law."'
Another interesting proposal builds on the appointment of Marshall Roth-
stein, where the Liberals generated a list of nominees, but the Conservative Prime
Minister appointed the judge. The result was a candidate on which both major
parties agreed. McCormick proposes a general appointments process in which
opposition parties submit nominations from which the prime minister chooses."
Yet another suggestion is for provincial premiers to nominate candidates,
from which the prime minister must choose an appointee. Proponents argue
that because the Supreme Court decides federalism cases, it seems unfair that
only one level of government has the power to appoint judges. This proposal
was included in the Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, which were never
adopted, and has been given diminished attention in recent years.
C. THE UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
As can be seen, there has been considerable debate surrounding judicial appoint-
ments in Canada. However, much of the debate is discursive, lacking a firm
empirical foundation for the assumptions on which it is based. Those in favour
of a more political process assume that parliamentary hearings will expose the
hidden policy preferences of Supreme Court nominees. Decisions would then
be based on a nominee's legal abilities as well as his or her revealed policy pref-
erences. This transparency is regarded as superior to a process which is closed
to public scrutiny and in which an independent commission vets names and
provides a short list to the prime minister. One of the key assumptions of those
46. Hogg, "Rothstein," supra note 16 at 535.
47. McCormick, "Serendipitous," supra note 20 at 544-45.
48. McCormick, "Selecting," supra noie 13 at 30-32.
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in favour of public hearings is, therefore, that such hearings will reliably uncover
a candidate's preferences and provide an indication of how a judge will vote in
future appeals. Complaints regarding the current process assume that prime min-
isters have for too long been able to appoint individuals who will systematically
pursue justice in a way that is consistent with the prime minister's own political
outlook.
Those in favour of a process that is more consciously insulated from overt
political pressure, such as one involving an independent commission, worry that
a more political process, such 'as that of the United States, will affect the type of
individuals who are selected for the Supreme Court. This, in turn, affects the
type of decision making by those who are on the Court. Proponents of this
view seek the strongest jurists without regard to their policy preferences. They
are concerned about the current Canadian appointments process because they
believe it may lead to the appointment of justices based more on the appeal of
their policy preferences to prime ministers than on their legal talent and acumen.
The assumption underlying this position is that most appeals can be decided on
the basis of legal reasoning without recourse to one's policy preferences. Uhder
this view, it would be dangerous to adopt a system of judicial appointments
that will yield weak jurists with policy preferences that appear to be politically
attractive to a governing party. The best possible system, on this view, would be
one that could reliably assess a prospective judge's legal abilities and commit-
ment to deciding cases on the basis of their legal merits, rather than in a results-
oriented or "attitudinal" manner.
One of the central assumptions underlying this debate is that it is possible
to know the policy preferences of a prospective judge before making an appoint-
ment. After all, if prime ministers cannot determine ex ante how a particular
justice is likely to vote in politically charged appeals, then it would seem that
the hopes of those in the first camp of exposing and testing nominees' political
preferences are fanciful at best.
A further assumption is that justices come "pre-loaded" with a certain policy
orientation and that this policy orientation does not, or is unlikely to, change
over time. In other words, there is an assumption that justices will have unwav-
ering, constant policy preferences. This assumption is important because, even
if a justice's policy preferences can be known at the time of appointment, this
information may be of only short-run relevance if the views of justices are subject
to continuous drift, revision, refinement, and change.
14 (2009147 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
These assumptions give rise to a number of empirical questions that we seek
to address in this article. Can a prospective justice's policy preferences be known
before appointment? Do justices' policy preferences change over time? Is there
a predictable pattern as to how the apparent policy preferences of justices change
over time?
The next part describes both the data set we use to address these questions
and the two distinct analytical approaches taken in assessing the empirical evi-
dence. Throughout the analysis, and to allow the model to be tractable, we
assume that judges decide cases at least partly on the basis of their policy prefer-
ences or attitudes. We are not committed to the view that Supreme Court judges
actually decide cases almost always, usually, or even commonly, on the basis of
their policy preferences, but stress instead that our methodological approaches
are pragmatic and open-minded. We are aware that the attitudinal model of
judicial decision making has been subjected to considerable empirical testing
in the US literature. That literature generally supports the attitudinal model,
accepting the assumption that judicial decision making is based, in part, on policy
preferences, particularly in civil rights and civil liberties cases." As will be dis-
cussed further in Part II, there have been fewer studies of the applicability of
the attitudinal model to Canadian courts. The studies that have been done tend
to find that attitudinal factors are important to judicial decision making, but
policy preferences are (not surprisingly) not the only factor that judges take
into account.5i
49. See e.g. Jeffrey A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) [Segal & Spaeth, Supreme Court]; Jeffrey A.
Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) [Segal & Spaeth, Revisited]; Cass R.
Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political? An Empirical Analysis of the FederalJudiciary
(Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2006); and Andrew D. Martin et al., "Competing
Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decision Making" (2004) 2 Persp. on Pol. 761.
50. "Although a substantial amount of attitudinal decision making appears in diverse areas of law
in the post-Charter Court, especially in non-unanimous cases, the impact of ideology is not
as crystal-clear or as systematic as that found in the US context." C.L. Ostberg & Matthew
E. Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making in the Supreme Court of Canada (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 2007) at 226 [Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal
Decision Making]; C. Neal Tate & Panu Sittiwong, "Decision Making in the Canadian
Supreme Court: Extending the Personal Attributes Model Across Nations" (1989) 51 J. Pol.
900; Donald Songer & Susan Johnson, "Attitudinal Decision Making in the Supreme Court
of Canada" (Paper presented to the Midwest Political Science Association Meetings, 2002)
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We do not assume that the Supreme Court judges decide cases solely on the
basis of policy preferences. However, in order to test the applicability of the
attitudinal model of judicial decision making, we formulate our analyses around
this assumption to see what conclusions emerge from the data.
There are two other principal models of judicial decision making.51 First,
the "strategic" model assumes that judges do not "sincerely" or directly vote for
their preferred policy outcome in each case, but instead take into account how
their votes will affect and be affected by other actors (such as other judges on
the particular court) and other institutions (such as the legislature). 2 Second,
there is a "legal" model which assumes that judges vote in accordance with legal
principles, norms of statutory interpretation, and precedent. In cases where this
approach yields ambiguous results, judges attempt to. interpret the case law or
statute in the manner most consistent with the aims of the statute or case law as
a whole.
Although the attitudinal model rejects a rigid, formalistic conception of
judging,5 3 it does not necessarily reject the idea that judicial discretion is con-
strained to some extent by established statutory law or precedent. In deploying
the attitudinal model, we also do not naively assume that strategic considerations
(such as how the legislature will react to judicial decisions) are irrelevant. Our
[unpublished]; and Thaddeus Hwong, "A Review of Quantitative Studies of Decision
Making in the Supreme Court of Canada" (2004) 30 Man. L.J. 353 [Hwong, "Review"].
51. For a discussion of different models of judging, see Segal & Spaeth, Revisited, supra note 49.
Chapter two discusses models that emphasize the effects of statute and precedent; chapter
three introduces models of strategic considerations. -
52. See e.g. Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, The Choices Justices Make (Washington: Congressional
Quarterly Press, 1998) (arguing that justices should be viewed as voting strategically); Thomas
H. Hammond, Chris W. Bonneau & Reginald S. Sheehan, Strategic Behavior and Policy
Choice on the U.S. Supreme Court (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005) (presenting a
formal model of strategic decision making by judges); Forrest Maltzman, James F. Spriggs II
& Paul J. Wahlbeck, Crafting Law on the Supreme Court. The Collegial Game (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000) (examining coalition-building on the US Supreme Court);
and ibid. (discussing models of judicial decision making).
53. Such a formal approach is variously referred to as an "idealist," "traditionalist," or "positivist"
view of judicial decision making. See e.g. James A. McKenna III, "The Judge as Dramatist"
(1982) 5:2 ASLA Forum, online: <http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/lpop/etext/sf/mckenna5.h'tm>.
McKenna describes the "positivist judge" as someone who "does not readily abandon
precedent or interpret a statute in such a novel way that he then becomes an activist,
substituting principles for rules, what ought to be for what is."
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underlying methodological assumption is, however, that judges do exercise
some discretion in deciding appeals, and that in doing so they inevitably draw
upon and reveal information about their policy preferences and attitudes.
As we will discuss in Part IV, the results of our empirical analysis raise serious
questions about the applicability of the attitudinal model of decision making to
the Supreme Court. We suggest that a better understanding might come through
a new model that draws on the insights of each of the attitudinal, strategic, and
legal models.5"
II. ASSESSING THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
A. DATA
To analyze the issues surrounding the prediction of the voting behaviour of
Supreme Court judges, we created a database that accounts for the institutional
features of the Court, the voting record of each justice, and the potential differ-
ences across different areas of law. The database includes all reported Supreme
Court decisions (both appeals and references) heard from the beginning of Sep-
tember 1982 to the end of June 2005."s We coded the cases for a number of
basic categories, such as outcome of appeal,56 panel size, and the contribution
of each justice to the disposition of the appeal.5 7
54. Another theory of judicial decisions assumes that judges, like other people, seek the esteem
and respect of others and therefore decide cases in a manner that appeals to various audiences
whose esteem and respect they value. See Lawrence Baum, Judges and Their Audiences: A
Perspective on Judicial Behavior (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) [Baum,
Audiences]. Baum argues for the importance of the audiences to which judges are appealing
and the lack of a theory of judicial motivation in other approaches to judicial decision making.
55. Motions, applications, and interventions were not included. This information was retrieved
from the Supreme Court Reports and the LexUM website, courtesy of the University of
Montreal's Faculty of Law. Judgments that result from two appeals were indexed as one case,
just as they are published. This data set has been subject to random sampling and no errors
have been found to date. However, despite our best efforts, we cannot guarantee that our
data set is error free. For more information on the manner of coding the decisions, please
contact the authors.
56. The treatment of each case was divided into three categories: (1) appeal allowed, (2) appeal
dismissed, and (3) mixed and appeal allowed in part. Where possible, references were sorted
into one of these three categories.
57. For the contribution of each justice in each decision, we examined their type of participation:
(1) concurring, (2) majority, (3) dissenting and dissenting in part, and (4) unanimous. We
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In order to get a sense of whether policy preferences matter or change in
accordance with the subject matter of the case, we coded the appeals by area of
law. 8 While all cases were categorized, for the purposes of much of the analysis
in this article, the relevant case categories are:
59
" Aboriginal (including fishing, hunting, and land rights, the fiduciary duty of the
Crown, the constitutionality of statutes/laws under section 35(1), and Indian
Act65 appeals);
" Charter of Rights and Freedoms (encompassing all types of Charter challenges); 61
" Criminal (including substantive and procedural issues, as well as Charter issues);62
also coded whether the justice delivered or wrote the judgment. Where no single justice has
written the judgment, as in aper curium decision, no single justice received credit (there were
twenty-four such judgments). Where a justice is part of both the majority and concurring
judgment, he or she is marked as a part of the concurring judgment. Where a justice is part
of two different concurring or dissenting judgments, he or she is marked as having a judgment
of their own. Justices that dissent only in the cross-appeal are considered part of the majority.
58. This categorization was surprisingly challenging. There is no widely recognized way to
organize appeals by category and, indeed, appeals frequently and organically raise multiple,
loosely related issues. Difficult choices were made based on a careful reading of the decision
in each appeal and, where necessary, analysis of the judgments of the court of appeal and trial
court in each case.
59. We categorized all decisions, such that the data we used included all decisions during this
period, but, in order to allow our statistical analysis, some of the finer categorization could
not be used in this paper. The other categories were administrative, constitutional (including
such issues as division of powers, but not Charter challenges or Aboriginal issues), corporate
(including bankruptcy, competition law, pension law, banking, intellectual property, insurance,
patents, copyright, and bills of exchange), evidence (including both civil and criminal evidence),
immigration (encompassing immigration and refugee issues), municipal (including validity
of bylaws and review of municipal action), private (including contracts, torts, property,
equity, trust, and family law), procedural (encompassing civil procedure), and public
(including human and civil rights other than Charter, environmentalIaw, unemployment
insurance, maritime law, Customs Act, expropriation, and Communication law).
60. R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5.
61. The only time a case is given a secondary classification under the Charter category is when it
is classified first under criminal or immigration.
62. Since each case was assigned to up to two categories, when appeals are considered to be criminal
or Charter, it was sufficient for our purposes (unless otherwise specifically noted) that one
of the categories assigned corresponded to the category of appeals being considered. Thus,
to take the most common example, if an appeal was assigned to both the criminal category
and also the Charter category, it was- included in each separate category in our results (again,
unless otherwise stipulated). It would have been reasonable to make those appeals that bring
together two different areas of law into distinctive categories (for example, by creating a
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" Labour (including appeals concerning employment contracts, unions, interpretation,
and application of collective agreements, and arbitration); and
" Tax (including income tax, property tax, and the Goods and Services Tax).
In the United States, the party of the appointing president has been used
extensively to analyze the decisions of the Supreme Court, with studies finding
some connection between the party and voting in civil rights and liberties cases.63
However, Segal and Cover developed an alternative proxy to measure the ideol-
ogy of the justices based on an analysis of newspaper editorials at the time the
justice was appointed ("Segal-Cover scores")." In the American literature, it has
been found that these Segal-Cover scores are correlated with a judge's votes in
civil rights and liberties cases.65
Ostberg and Wetstein have developed a similar set of scores for most of the
Canadian justices in the post-Charter period ("Ostberg-Wetstein scores"). "
These scores are reported below, sorted according to the party of the prime
minister responsible for each justice's appointment. The justices were scored on
a scale of +2.00 (very liberal) to -2.00 (very conservative). Unlike the Segal-Cover
scores, however, Ostberg and Wetstein based their scoring on editorial language
about "a given justice's. overall approach to the law in general as well as to spe-
cific areas of law."67 Somewhat unfortunately for our purposes, Ostberg-Wetstein
scores are not available for all the twenty-seven justices that served on the Court-
for the twenty-three terms that are included in our analysis. Nevertheless, in the
Charter-only category, a criminal-only category, and a combined Charter-criminal category).
However, given the limited number of appeals heard over the time period covered by our
data set, we concluded that, as a general matter, some double-counting was preferable to
mutual exclusion.
63. See e.g. Nancy C. Staudt, Lee Epstein & Peter Wiedenbeck, "The Ideological Component of
Judging in the Taxation Context" (2006) 84 Wash. U. L. Rev. 1797 at 1799, 1801 (describing
a number of methods for estimating political preferences of justices).
64. See e.g. Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, "Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S.
Supreme Court Justices" (1989) 83 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 557. These scores were based on an
analysis of the language used in the editorials of four newspapers. The ideology was scored
on a scale of +1.00 (liberal) to -1.00 (conservative).
65. See e.g. Staudt, Epstein & Wiedenbeck, supra note 63 at 1807-09 (discussing some of the
studies using Segal-Cover scores).
66. Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 50 at 55. These scores are
based on an analysis of editorials in nine Canadian regional papers.
67. Ibid. at 51.
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case of judges for whom scores are available, there is an interesting connection
between the scores and the party of the appointing prime minister. Conservative
party appointees appear to be evenly spread between positive and negative
Ostberg-Wetstein scores. Liberal appointees, on the other hand, seem predomi-
nantly to have positive (i.e., liberal) scores.
68
B. THE DIRECT METHOD
The first methodology uses a direct approach to estimate the preferences of
Supreme Court judges. The direct approach examines five areas of law where
votes can be characterized more readily-though not without some contro-
versy-as "conservative" or "liberal." The votes of each individual justice in
these areas are analyzed under the assumption that these votes are their "revealed
preferences."69 For the purposes of the analysis, we will assume that these votes
reflect their underlying policy preferences.7 " This method uses information
about the different categories of the appeals to assign "liberal" or "conservative"
labels71 to the votes of justices.7 2
68. Among the justices appointed by Conservative prime ministers, several scored quite
conservatively, such as Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 (-2.00 in criminal law), Justice Chouinard
(-1.375), and Justice Major (-1.320). Conservative prime ministers also appointed some
justices who were scored by Ostberg and Wetstein as liberally-inclined justices, including
Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 (+1.32 in civil liberties), Justice La Forest (+ 1.50), and Justice
Cory (+0.967). The justices appointed by Liberal prime ministers, on the other hand, attracted
more uniformly positive Ostberg-Wetstein scores, with only Justice LeBel (-0.704) being
scored as a conservative. Justice Deschamps (0.00) was scored as neither conservative nor liberal.
69. Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, "Assessing Preference Change on the US Supreme
Court" (2007) 23 J.L. Econ. & Org. 365 at 366, 368.
70.. See Part IV, below, for a discussion of the limitations of this assumption.
71. The terms "liberal" and "conservative" are .apt to be somewhat misleading and to raise asso-
ciations that we do not necessarily want to evoke. Nevertheless, we are following convention
in using these labels.
72. One of the limitations with the data set used in this article is that it encompasses only appeals
heard and decided by the Court. In fact, most appeals require the leave of the Court in
order for the appeal to be heard. Panels of Supreme Court justices decide whether or not to
grant leave to appeal except for the few cases which are granted leave to appeal as of right.
This process for deciding the docket of the Court provides the opportunity for a biased
sample of decisions to be heard by the Court-that is, it is possible that the decision on
leave to appeal could result in cases before the Court that are more or less likely to give rise to
liberal or conservative votes by justices. For a discussion of this limitation on studies of the
Court, see Sujit Choudhry & Claire E. Hunter, "Measuring Judicial Activism on the
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Our coding is based on an approach used in recent studies of judicial atti-
tudes in the United States.73 We coded judicial votes in the following five areas:
(i) Charter appeals (where a vote in favour of the claimant is considered to be liberal,
and a vote in favour of the government is considered to be conservative);
(ii) criminal appeals (where a vote in favour of the defendant is considered to be lib-
eral, and a vote in favour of the prosecution is considered to be conservative);
(iii) labour appeals (where a vote in favour of a union, labour organization, or worker
is considered to be liberal, and a vote in favour of an employer or business interest is
considered to be conservative);
(iv) tax appeals (where a vote in favour of the government is considered to be liberal,
and a vote in favour of the taxpayer is considered to be conservative); and
(v) Aboriginal rights appeals (where a vote in favour of an Aboriginal group or indi-
vidual is considered to be liberal, and a vote in favour of the government is consid-
ered to be conservative).74
The analysis in this article builds on prior empirical studies of the Supreme
Court and the voting records of justices, with some notable differences.75 First,
Supreme Court of Canada: A Comment on Newfoundland (Treasury Board) v. NAPE'
(2003) 48 McGill L.J. 525 at 556. Further, there may be bias in voting records because the
Chief Justice decides the size (five, seven, or nine justices) and the composition of the panel
hearing a particular case. See e.g. Lori Hausegger & Stacia Haynie, "Judicial Decisionmaking
and the Use of Panels in the Canadian Supreme Court and the South African Appellate
Division" (2003) 37 Law & Soc'y Rev. 635 (discussing the potential bias in the selection of
the composition of the panel by the Chief Justice). We cannot test for such selection issues in
this article, but leave these questions for future research.
73. See e.g. Sunstein etal, supra note 49. Sunstein and his colleagues code as liberal any vote to
grant a defendant relief in a criminal appeal (at 48), to uphold an environmental regulation,
a decision in favour of a union against a challenge by industry, or in favour of an individual
bringing a claim of discrimination (at 19). For Canadian analysis, see e.g. Tate & Sittiwong,
supra note 50; Songer & Johnson, supra note 50; and Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal
Decision Making, supra note 50.
74. These categorizations are necessarily rough. Some finer classifications may permit more tai-
lored results. See e.g. Staudt, Epstein & Wiedenbeck, supra note 63.
75. See e.g. Tate & Sittiwong, supra note 50; Songer & Johnson, supra note 50; Ostberg &
Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 50; Hwong, "Review," supra note 50;
C.L. Ostberg et al., "The Nature and Extent of Attitudinal Decision Making in the Supreme
Court of Canada" (Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, 2 September 2004) [unpublished]; and C.L. Ostberg & Matthew Wetstein,
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we use actual votes as the dependent variable. Most studies (other than those by
Ostberg and Wetstein, and Hwong76) have looked at the percentage of appeals
in which the justice voted in a liberal manner over the course of their career."
The use of actual votes makes analyzing the interaction between particular jus-
tices and the context of the case more precise as compared with aggregate career
voting patterns in an area of law. Second, unlike prior studies, we reverse the
usual coding of a vote as liberal which upholds a government action in the face
of a Charter challenge by a business. Third, we analyze both unanimous and
non-unanimous decisions, not merely non-unanimous decisions.78 Unanimous
decisions contain considerable information about the willingness of justices to
vote in certain ways, especially because the Supreme Court can overrule its prior
decisions both directly and indirectly."
There is one other important difference. Most prior studies use broad cate-
gorizations of areas of law (civil rights, criminal, and economic). As explained in
Part II.A, above, we based our analysis on more detailed categorizations. These
categorizations should allow for a closer examination of whether or not there is
a tie between attitudes and particular areas of law. However, even our initial
categorizations may be too broad to capture some relevant differences between
political parties in Canada."0
"Dimensions of Attitudes Underlying Search and Seizure Decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada" (1998) 31 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 767.
76. Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, ibid.; Thaddeus Hwong, A Quantitative
Exploration of-judicial Decision Making in Canadian Income Tax Cases (PhD Dissertation,
Osgoode Hall Law School, 2006), online: <http://www.yorku.ca/fodden/hwong
/hwong-whole.pdf> [Hwong, "Quantitative Exploration"]. '
77. See e.g. Tate & Sittiwong, supra note 50; Songer & Johnson, supra note 50 at 13.
78. Ostberg & Wetstein also use both unanimous and non-unanimous decisions in some of their
analysis. Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 50.
79. See Songer & Johnson, supra note 50. The authors argue that non-unanimous decisions are a
good proxy for appeals in which justices had no prior restraint on voting their preferences in
a particular instance. See also Tate & Sittiwong, supra note 50. These authors argue that
unanimous appeals add no helpful information for explaining judicial decision making (at
902). However, unanimous decisions are not a good proxy for when justices have a choice, as
the Supreme Court of Canada can overrule its own prior decisions. Omitting unanimous
decisions excludes a considerable amount of information on voting patterns given the high
proportion of appeals in each term that are unanimous.
80. See Part IV for a discussion of some of the implications and limitations of our analysis.
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C. THE INDIRECT METHOD: MARTIN-QUINN
The second empirical methodology we bring to bear on the data is based on the
approach developed by American political scientists Andrew Martin and Kevin
Quinn in analyzing the US Supreme Court.8 It brings together Bayesian statisti-
cal methods (in our case, with neutral priors-that is, no prior assumptions
about where a particular judge lies in the policy space), Gibbs sampling, 2 and a
Markov Chain Monte Carlo process, culmina'ting in a computationally inten-
sive and quite flexible method of estimating indirectly the posterior distribu-
tions of the ideal points of the justices of the Supreme Court using an item-
response theory model.83
A number of assumptions are made in setting up the model of judicial de-
cision making that underlies this indirect method. First, it is assumed that the
relevant attitudinal or policy space is either (i) one-dimensional (i.e., a line or
spectrum) or (ii) two-dimensional (i.e., a plane). In their study of the US Su-
preme Court, Martin and Quinn have shown that a one-dimensional policy
space does an excellent job of capturing the differences in decision making among
justices; however, for the reasons alluded to above, we are not as convinced that
a one-dimensional policy space properly characterizes decision making on the
Supreme Court of Canada. For this reason, it would be ideal to also estimate a
two-dimensional item-response theory model for the Supreme Court of Canada.
Unfortunately, from this perspective, a two-dimensional item-response theory
model is not estimable for the twenty-three terms of our study. We are able,
however, to estimate a two-dimensional model for a period of the 1990s, during
which the composition of the Court remained unchanged.
Second, the indirect methodology implicitly assumes that judges vote their
simple policy preferences in accordance with an attitudinal model of decision
81. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, "Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999" (2002) 10 Pol. Analysis 134
[Martin & Quinn, "Dynamic Ideal"].
82. For an excellent and relatively accessible introduction to the Gibbs sampling method, see
George Casella & Edward I. George, "Explaining the Gibbs Sampler" (1992) 46 The
American Statistician 167.
83. The C++ source code used by Martin and Quinn in the generation of their results in the
Political Analysis article is available online. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn,
online: Martin-Quinn Scores Replication <http:I/mqscores.wustl.edulreplication.php>. We
used this source code with appropriate modifications to generate the results reported below.
ALARIE & GREEN, SUPREME COURT OF CANADA APPOINTMENTS 23
making.8" We do not model any strategic interactions between the votes of
different justices, and we ignore any potential "panel effects" that may arise
from certain justices being affected by the presence of other justices on the same
panel.8" Thus, a vote to affirm indicates that, given their ideal policy point,
affirming gives a particular justice a greater individual payoff-in other words,
provides a better ideological fit for that judge-than would reversing the appeal.
The model treats each judge's "attitude" or "ideal point" as a latent, unobserved,
random variable.
The methodology draws on information inherent in the observation that
justices of the Court split in their disposition of appeals that they hear. When
justices split in their disposition, it follows from the above assumptions that the
reason for this is that their attitudes differ regarding the case. Moreover, the
attitudes of the judges differ systematically, with the justices affirming the appeal
collectively having ideal points on one side of the policy spectruni, and the jus-
tices voting to reverse having ideal points on the other.
Importantly, the Martin-Quinn method does not assume that a vote to af-
firm or reverse in any given case is conservative or liberal. Instead, it automati-
cally converges on the most appropriate posterior distribution of the unob-
served ideal points through the Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation. We
use two main variations of the Martin-Quinn approach. The first assumes con-
stant judicial preferences.86 The second variation assumes that judicial prefer-
ences are dynamic and may shift from term to term. The dynamic Martin-
84. This assumption can be supported on the basis that the Martin-Quinn method uses only
non-unanimous cases, and these are cases in which justices truly do have the discretion to go
either way in their disposition of the appeal.
85. This is an oversimplification. Research by Cass Sunstein in the United States has shown that
panel effects can be significant on Circuit Courts of Appeal. See Sunstein et al., supra note 49.
86. The constant Martin-Quinn approach assumes that the ideal policy point distribution of a
particular justice is static over his or her entire career. This assumption is consistent with
most of the literature covering the Supreme Court of Canada. Early empirical work used
scalogram analysis, which implicitly assumed that judicial preferences remained constant
throughout a justice's career. See e.g. Sidney R. Peck, "The Supreme Court of Canada, 1958-
.1966: A Search for Policy Through Scalogram Analysis" (1967) 45 Can. Bar Rev. 666;
Sidney R. Peck, "A Scalogram Analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada, 1958-1967" in
Glendon Schubert & David J. Danelski, eds., Comparative Judicial Behavior: Cross-Cultural
Studies of Political Decision-Making in the East and West (New York: Oxford University Press,
1969) 293; and Donald E. Fouts, "Policy-Making in the Supreme Court of Canada, 1950-
1960" in Schubert & Danelski, 257.
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Quinn approach is more flexible and assumes that the preferences of judges can
and indeed do change over time. The statistical techniques underlying the
methodology are well-known and have been described elsewhere in the litera-
ture in considerable detail.8"
III. PREDICTING JUDICIAL POLICY PREFERENCES
In order to test the assumptions underlying the debate about judicial appoint-
ments, this section asks and attempts to answer three discrete questions.
87. A quick description of the underlying technology is as follows. The Gibbs sampler used in
the Martin-Quinn approach is typically used when there are known joint distributions of
variables x and yi, y2 ..., yn, but the marginal distributions are unknown. Mathematically,
the most straightforward way to uncover the marginal distributions is to integrate the joint
distribution over yi, y2 .... yn. However, the technical wherewithal required to compute the
integration can, in many cases, be unattainable (it may also be mathematically impossible).
The Gibbs sampler provides an alternative way to find the marginal distribution of x. The
technique assumes that all conditional probabilities are known. The researcher must specify a
starting value for y. Since we know conditional probabilities, we know the distribution of x
given the starting value of y. The Gibbs sampling technique simulates a value of x from that
distribution. It chooses that value randomly, based on the likelihood of each value occurring,
as determined by the conditional probability distribution. Next, since the conditional
probability distribution of (y I x) is known, we can calculate the probability distribution of y
given our simulated value of x. By simulating that distribution, we come up with a new value
for y. We can then determine the distribution of x given our new value of y, simulate a value
of x from that distribution, and so on. As the iterations of the sampler approach infinity, the
distribution it finds for x approaches the actual marginal distribution of x. Hence, the
simulated samples taken from the sampler's distribution are equivalent to samples from the
marginal distribution. Normally, the sampler is run many thousands (and sometimes
millions) of times, with the expectation that ultimately it will converge on an equilibrium
distribution. When it has converged, we know that the distributions it generates are
independent of the starting values of y and, hence, are more likely to approximate the true
marginal distribution of x. The dynamic approach works similarly to the constant approach
by performing the above steps in each term of the Court and then comparing how the ideal
point changes over time. The method does not look at each term independently or in
isolation. Instead, the dynamic variant of the Martin-Quinn method assumes a random walk
in judicial attitudes from term to term. There is a variable that represents how much
smoothing takes place from one term to the next. This allows the method to "borrow
strength" across terms for each justice. The dynamic linear model begins with an
uninformative prior about the posterior distribution of each justice's ideal point but, as the
analysis proceeds, uses as a prior for each term the justice's ideal point for the foregoing term.
For more detail on the Martin-Quinn methodology we deploy in our empirical analysis, see
Martin & Quinn, "Dynamic Ideal," supra note 81 at 137-45.
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First, if we assume that each justice has a stable set of policy preferences on
which he or she bases his or her votes in particular cases, can these preferences
be predicted ex ante? We seek to answer this question by comparing the judge's
voting pattern over his or her whole career with (i) the policy preferences of the
appointing prime minister, and (ii) the Ostberg-Wetstein scores assigned to the
justices based on newspaper accounts at the time of their appointments.
Second, even if there is little apparent relationship between a judge's voting
pattern over his or her career and the appointing prime minister or the Ostberg-
Wetstein scores, is this relationship present at least at the beginning of his or
her time on the Court? The assumption is that even if preferences do change
over time, the prime minister or newspaper editorialists may be able to predict,
at least in the short-term, how justices will vote upon their appointment to the
Court.
Finally, even if there is little ostensible relationship between even the first
few years and the preferences of the prime minister, can we say anything about
how a judge's votes change over time? Is there, for example, a systematic way in
which judicial policy preferences appear to change? Do differences appear in how
policy preferences shift over time between judges appointed by Conservative
prime ministers and those appointed by Liberal prime ministers?
A. CAN JUDGES' PREFERENCES BE PREDICTED EXANTE?
Most of the literature that uses an attitudinal approach to judicial decision mak-
ing assumes that judges have a certain, unbending set of policy preferences.88 It
is important, therefore, to start with this assumption and see if it holds true for.
the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada for the 1982 to 2004 terms. This
assumption will subsequently be relaxed when we consider how the policy pref-
erences of different judges change over their time on the Court. Assuming first
that judges have constant preferences, we ask two questions.
First, how strong is the relationship between the political parties of the prime
ministers who appointed the justices who were on the Court from 1982 to 2004
and the justices' voting patterns? Second, how strong is the relationship between
88. Lee Epstein et al., "Do Political Preferences Change? A Longitudinal Study of U.S. Supreme
Court Justices" (1998) 60J. Pol. 801 at 801-02 [Epstein et al., "Political Preferences"]; Lee
Epstein et al., "Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, and How
Important?" (2007) 101 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1483 at 5-7, online: <http:/fmqscores.wustl.edu/
medialPrefChange.pdf> [Epstein et al., "Ideological Drift"].
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contemporaneous accounts from newspapers at the times that the judges were
appointed-i.e., their Ostberg-Wetstein scores-and the subsequent voting
patterns of the judges?
Using the indirect Martin-Quinn approach, separate analyses were done
for three different sets of cases. The first analysis considered all cases between
1982 and 2004. During these twenty-three terms, there were a total of 502 split
decisions. The second set of cases-all of the non-criminal appeals-were ana-
lyzed together. There were 246 non-criminal appeals. The third set of cases in-
cluded only the 256 criminal appeals. We examined criminal cases separately, as
there were a large number of criminal cases in the complete data set and some
judges-at least qualitatively-appear to take different approaches to criminal
appeals than to other types of appeals.89 We feared that the approach of some of
the judges (most notably Justice L'Heureux-Dubd) to criminal appeals were un-
duly driving the overall results. The separate results, along with relative rank,
are reported in Table 1 for (i) all cases, (ii) non-criminal cases, and (iii) criminal
cases. This was done in order to assess, in a qualitative way, how robust the
assumption of a'single-dimensional policy space was acrogs various, different
types of cases. The short answer is that it is relatively robust.9"
Table 1 reports the mean of the ideal point (IP) posterior distributions of
the twenty-seven judges who served on the Court from 1982 to 2004. A glance
at the results reported in Table 1, below, suggests that the assumption of a one-
dimensional policy space (that is, just left and right) across case types is some-
what problematic. The correlation between the "all cases" ideal points and the
"non-criminal" ideal points is +0.87, and between "all cases" and "criminal," it
is +0.75."' While these correlations are high, there is an overlap in these catego-
89. Ideally, we would have preferred a finer categorization than "non-criminal," as this large
grouping includes many different types of cases, such as Charter, tax, and business. However,
any finer categorization would affect convergence with the indirect method because the
number of cases in these categories would be too small. We do, however, use a somewhat
finer categorization in the direct analysis.
90. All of these results were obtained by using the one-dimensional item-response theory
function in the MCMCpack plug-in for the open source statistical package R, with 220,000
iterations, of which the first 20,000 were for burn-in. The standard diagnostic functions
programmed in MCMCpack showed that the posterior distributions had converged. See
Martin, Quinn & Park, infra note 93.
91 .The correlation shows the relationship between the ideal points for each judge when using all
cases and when using non-criminal cases. A higher correlation means that they are more similar.
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TABLE 1: MARTIN-QUINN CONSTANT MODEL
RESULTS BY JUSTICE (RANKED BY ALL CASESI
Justice Appointing All Cases Non-Criminal Criminal
Party IP Rank IP Rank IP Rank
Stevenson CON 1.464 1 1.472 2 0.847 6
Estey LIB 1.237 2 1.965 1 0.447 9
Sopinka CON 1.113 3 1.13 3 1.229 3
Major CON 1.034 4 0.907 5 1.303 2
Charron LIB 0.792 5 0.180 16 0.866 5
Laskin LIB 0.755 6 0.577 7 0.649 7
McIntyre LIB 0.731 7 0.520 8 -0.926 26
Arbour LIB 0.666 8 0.079 17 2.107 1
Beetz LIB 0.595 9 0.796 6 -0.189 20
Lamer LIB 0.583 10 0.477 9 0.962 4
Le Dain LIB 0.452 11 0.327 12 -0.243 21
Chouinard CON 0.411 12 1.126 4 -0.397 23
lacobucci CON 0.408 13 0.457 10 0.396 10
Abella LIB 0.397 14 0.296 13 0.313 13
Binnie LIB 0.306 15 0.345 11 0.358 11
Cory CON 0.239 16 0.180 15 0.341 12
Fish LIB 0.035 17 0.231 14 0.064 16
La Forest CON -0.062 18 0.012 19 -0.131 19
Dickson LIB -0.099 19 -0.197 21 0.108 15
McLachlin CON -0.102 20 0.014 18 -0.244 22
LeBel LIB -0.145 21 -0.210 22 -0.098 18
Ritchie CON -0.264 22 -0.290 24 0.502 8
Gonthier CON -0.276 23 -0.043 20 -0.512 24
Bastarache LIB -0.353 24 -0.211 23 -0.523 25
Deschamps LIB -0.698 25 -1.015 25 -0.053 17
Wilson LIB -0.853 26 -1.867 27 0.193 14
L'Heureux- CON -2.864 27 -1.649 26 -3.024 27
Dub _
ries (that is, between "all cases" and "non-criminal," and between "all cases"
and "criminal"). On the other hand, the correlation between "non-criminal"
and "criminal"-based on two data sets that share no decisions-is much lower
(+0.45).
Further, some of the results are surprising. For example, Justice McIntyre
shows up as a liberal judge with an ideal point of +0.731 on all cases, whereas
his voting record (as is shown below in the direct results) is more consistent
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with his having been a conservative judge. Troublingly, too, Justice Wilson ap-
pears to be the second-most conservative judge, which is inconsistent with our
expectations and appears to be anomalous given the results of the direct method.
Before moving on to probe these anomalies further, however, we make some
more observations about the results reported in Table 1, specifically with regard
to whether there is a relationship between how judges were sorted according to
the Martin-Quinn indirect methodology and (i) the party of the appointing
prime minister, and (ii) the judges' Ostberg-Wetstein scores.
Curiously, it appears that there is not at all a strong relationship between
the party of the prime minister who appointed the judges and their subsequent
voting preferences as revealed through their voting pat'terns. Notably, in Table
1, the highest and the lowest scoring judges were both appointed by the same
prime minister-Brian Mulroney, who led the Progressive Conservative Party.
This is not entirely an idiosyncratic finding. The second-highest and the second-
lowest scoring judges were appointed by the same prime minister as well-Pierre
Trudeau, a Liberal. Indeed, of the four most "liberal" judges (Stevenson, Estey,
Sopinka, and Major), three were appointed by Mulroney. Of the four most
"conservative" judges (Bastarache, Deschamps, Wilson, and L'Heureux Dub),
three were appointed by Liberals: two by Jean Chr~tien and one by Trudeau.92
There is, however, a small effect overall. In the "all cases" results, the aver-
age ideal point for Conservative appointees is +0.100 versus +0.275 for Liberal
appointees. This is reversed, however, for "non-criminal" appeals, where the
average ideal point for Conservative appointees is +0.302 versus +0.143 for
Liberal appointees. Finally, for criminal appeals, the average ideal point for
Conservative appointees is +0.028 versus +0.252 for Liberal appointees. These
results appear to support the idea that Conservative appointees are slightly more
conservative on average than Liberal appointees. However, it is worth noting
that the conclusion of this slight difference overall with the expected sign is
entirely driven by Justice L'Heureux-Dub6, who is an extreme outlier in terms
of her ideal points in "all cases" and "criminal" appeals. Indeed, she is such an
extreme outlier that we became concerned that her inclusion may be making
the results of the Martin-Quinn method unreliable.
92. We use the terms "conservative" and "liberal" here cautiously because it is not obvious that it
is appropriate to describe the two ends of the ideal point spectrum in this way. However, as
will be seen in the comparison between the Martin-Quinn results and the direct method
results, this is a reasonable characterization, so long as one bears in mind the necessary caveats.
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With regard to the relationship between the ideal points and Ostberg-
Wetstein scores, it appears that there is a modest relationship between the two.
If one uses as an Ostberg-Wetstein score for Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 of -2.00
(i.e., very conservative), the score they assign her for criminal cases, then the
correlation between the Ostberg-Wetstein scores and "all cases" is +0.300. This
result is not statistically significant. On the other hand, if one uses the score Jus-
tice L'Heureux-Dub6 is assigned for civil liberties cases as the Ostberg-Wetstein
score, the correlation disappears-and is actually negative-at -0.275. If one
omits the Ostberg-Wetstein score for Justice L'Heureux-Dub, there is no clear
relationship at all between ideal points and Ostberg-Wetstein scores for the
remaining judges (the correlation is -0.028).
Our concerns regarding Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 led us to question the way
in which the Martin-Quinn method is sorting the other judges. In particular, as
mentioned above, the ideal point estimates for judges such as Bertha Wilson
and William McIntyre do not seem to accord with our expectations, given what
we know about their voting behaviour from the direct results and from more
qualitative accounts of their judicial decision making. More specifically, the
direct results show that Justice McIntyre voted liberally in just 36.5 per cent of
appeals in the five areasconsidered (ranking him 24th of 27 justices), but the
mean of his ideal point estimate overall is +0.731 (ranking him 7th of 27 jus-
tices). With respect to Justice Wilson, the -direct method shows that she voted
liberally in 46.5 per cent of appeals in the five areas considered (ranking her 6th
of 27 justices), but the mean of her ideal point estimate overall is -0.853 (ranking
26th of 27 justices). As these results were startling, we decided to see what would
happen without Justice L'Heureux-Dub6. In other words, her votes on all cases
were removed from the data set, and the analysis was rerun. The results are re-
ported in Table 2.
Oddly, omitting Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 (LHD) causes a "flipping" of the
ideal points of the justices who were appointed well before her, but no such
flipping for justices who were appointed to the Court after 1985. The correla-
tion of the ideal points "with LHD" and "without LHD" for Justices Ritchie
through to Le Dain (those appointed pre-1985) is -0.794. The correlation of
the ideal points "with LHD" and "without LHD" for Justices La Forest through
to Charron (those appointed from 1985 to 2004) gives a correlation of +0.833.
This is strong evidence that Justice L'Heureux-Dub6's votes affected the reli-
ability of the results.
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TABLE 2: MARTIN-QUINN CONSTANT MODEL
RESULTS WITH AND WITHOUT JUSTICE L'HEUREUX-DUBtE [LHDJ
Year Ap- justice With LHD Without LHD Diff Rank
pointed IP Rank IP Rank Change
1959 Ritchie 0.264 22 0.146 14 0.118 8
1970 Laskin -0.755 6 0.465 22 -1.220 -16
1973 Dickson 0.099 19 -0.319 7 0.418 12
1974 Beetz -0.595 9 0.445 21 -1.040 -12
1977 Estey -1.237 2 0.426 20 -1.664 -18
1979 McIntyre -0.731 7 0.864 26 -1.595 -19
1979 Chouinard -0.411 12 0.329 18 -0.740 -6
1980 Lamer -0.583 10 -0.277 9 -0.305 1
1982 Wilson 0.853 26 -2.658 1 3.511 25
1984 Le Dain -0.452 11 0.290 17 -0.742 -6
1985 La Forest 0.062 18 0.365 19 -0.303 -1
1987 LHD 2.864 27 - - - -
1988 Sopinka -1.113 3 -0.602 5 -0.511 -2
1989 Gonthier 0.276 23 0.486 24 -0.210 -1
1989 Cory -0.239 16 -0.136 12 -0.103 4
1989 McLachlin 0.102 20 0.466 24 -0.210 -1
1990 Stevenson -1.464 1 -0.844 3 -0.620 -2
1991 lacobucci -0.408 13 -0.255 10 -0.152 3
1992 Major -1.034 4 -0.662 4 -0.372 0
1997 Bastarache 0.353 24 0.911 27 -0.558 -3
1998 Binnie -0.306 15 -0.139 11 -0.168 4
1999 Arbour -0.666 8 -1.210 2 0.544 6
2000 LeBel 0.145 21 0.284 1 -0.139 5
2002 Deschamps 0.698 25 0.581 25 0.116 0
2003 Fish -0.035 17 -0.536 6 0.501 11
2004 Abella -0.397 14 -0.038 13 -0.359 1
2004 Charron -0.792 5 -0.301 8 -0.491 -3
One way to determine how Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 influences the results
of the indirect method is to introduce a second dimension to the item-response
theory model. This is something that has not, to our knowledge, been done
in analyses of the US Supreme Court, probably in large part because the one-
dimensional item-response theory model seems to do such a good job of charac-
terizing the policy preferences of the US justices. Here, however, given Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6's confounding effect on the estimates from the indirect method,
a stronger case might be made to consider adding in a second dimension.
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GRAPH: NATIONAL COURT IDEAL POINT ESTIMATES, 1992-1997




O Two-Dimensionat 0 One-DimensionaL
Adding a second dimension to the item-response theory model makes it
much more difficult to achieve convergence in the estimates of the posterior
distributions of the justices' ideal points. We were able to achieve convergence
over the almost five-year period from 13 November 1992, when Justice Major
joined the Court, to 30 September 1997, when Justice La Forest retired from
the Court. Over this period the same nine judges were on the Court. During
this period, there were 136 appeals in which the judges voted differently on
appeals. The results of the two-dimensional item-response theory model for the
1992 to 1997 Court appear above.93 One-dimensional estimates were made for
the same natural court period so that the results could be compared. There is
93. The two-dimensional item-response theory model was most recently estimated using Martin
and Quinn's indirect method. This method used version 0.95 of MCMCpack by Andrew D.
Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Jong Hee Park in the R statistical package, released 4 December
2008. For more on the MCMCpack plug-in for R, and its implementation of the Markov Chain
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considerable correspondence between the two-dimensional estimates and the one-
dimensional estimates. It does seem, however, that the added dimension is pick-
ing up on something distitictive about the decision making of Justices McLachlin
and L'Heureux-Dub. This is also apparent from the one-dimensional estimate
for Justice L'Heureux-Dub6, but it is not noticeable in the one-dimensional re-
sult for Justice McLachlin.
What the two-dimensional Martin-Quinn method is picking up with re-
spect to Justice McLachlin's decision making in this period is difficult to gauge.
The estimation procedure is concerned with converging on the most appropriate
posterior distributions of the justices' ideal points given their votes in the 136
divided appeals decided by the Court in this five year period.
Table 3 reports the results of the direct method and is analogous to Table 1
for the indirect method. Recall that the direct method assigns a direction to
voting in cases in five different types of appeals. Votes are coded as liberal when
they are in favour of (i) the accused in criminal appeals, (ii) rights claimants in
Charter cases, (iii) Aboriginal groups or individuals in Aboriginal rights cases,
(iv) labour unions in labour cases, and (v) the government in tax appeals. In the
following table, the justices are arranged from the highest percentage of liberal
votes over their career to the lowest (for the five areas of law considered in the
direct method). The Ostberg-Wetstein scores are also reported in the table, as
are the correlations of liberal voting proportions with the Ostberg-Wetstein
scores (in the final row).
The mean Liberal appointee had a liberal voting percentage of 43 per cent
while the mean Conservative appointee had a liberal voting percentage of 38
per cent. This difference of 5 per cent is statistically significant (p<0.01). At
first glance, it is difficult to see any significant relationship between the Ost-
berg-Wetstein scores and the percentage of liberal votes. This is borne out by
the correlations reported in the last row of Table 3. The correlations are low
(and in some cases negative). None are statistically significant.
The analysis was also conducted on subcategories of cases, as there may be
more or less of a connection between the political party of the prime minister
and voting, depending on the area of law. For example, US studies have found
a correlation between a judge's policy preferences and voting in civil rights and
liberties cases, but have generally not found a correlation in economic cases.94
94. Staudt, Epstein & Wiedenbeck, supra note 63 at 1799.
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TABLE 3: IDEOLOGY AND LIBERAL VOTES
95
iAppoiting L beral Voting (Pro: ortion of Votes) O-W
Party GGrours Crim Char Abor Lab Tax Score
Fish LIB 0.55 0.59 0.30 0.50 0.43 0.75 1.11
Arbour LIB 0.54 0.53 0.60 0.33 0.59 0.29 0.73
Deschamps LIB 0.51 0.51 0.38 0.60 0.39 0.83 0.00
Charron LIB 0.49 0.48 0.30 0.50 0.20 0.80 -
Laskin LIB 0.48 0.59 n/a 0.00 0.29 0.50 -
Wilson LIB 0.46 0.46 0.56 0.40 0.58 0.47 1.62
Chouifiard CON 0.45 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.36 -1.38
LeBel LIB 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.40 0.41 0.43 -0.70
Binnie LIB 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.54 0.54 0.38 0.21
Lamer LIB 0.43 0.42 0.45 0.38 0.52 0.24 1.42
Major CON 0.42 0.44 0.37 0.28 0.45 0.29 -1.32
Estey LIB 0.42 0.43 0.49 0.38 0.52 0.33 1.27
Dickson LIB 0.42 0.42 0.39 0.47 0.49 0.42 -
Abella LIB 0.42 0.41 0.27 0.50 0.25 0.50 -
Sopinka CON 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.45 0.49 0.31 0.15
Ritchie 'CON 0.41 0.44 0.00 0.33 0.50 0.33 -
Le Dain LIB 0.40 0.39 0.35 0.75 0.62 0.25 0.73
lacobucci CON 0.40 0.37 0.39 0.36 0.54 0.29 0.00
Stevenson CON 0.39 0.35 0.47 0.33 0.50 n/a 0.50
Beetz LIB 0.38 0.40 0.31 0.33 0.47 0.36 -
La Forest CON 0.38 0.35 0.41 - 0.36 0.51 0.36 1.50
Cory CON 0.38 0.33 0.41 0.44 0.61 0.44 0.97
McIntyre LIB 0.37 0.36 0.28 0.50 0.48 0.31 0.44
McLachlin CON 0.37 0.33 0.37 0.44 0.58 0.24 0.67
Bastarache LIB 0.35 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.52 0.41 1.33
Gonthier CON 0.32 0.27 0.33 0.36 0.56 0.28 -0.18
L'Heureux- CON 0.31 0.21 0.32 0.50 0.66 0.24 -2.00
Dub6 I _II__II_
Correlation with O-W 0.19 0.19 0.18 -0.09 0.10 0.17
Scores
95. The correlations with Ostberg-Wetstein scores in each area of law are taken over justices for
whom both mean liberal voting proportions and Ostberg-Wetstein scores exist (that is, the
tax correlation does not include Stevenson, Charron, Laskin, Dickson, Abella, Ritchie, or
Beetz). None of the correlations are significant at the 90% level. This table uses the Ostberg-
Wetstein score of -2.00 for Justice L'Heureux-Dub6. Ostberg and Wetstein assigned Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6 a score of -2.00 on criminal cases and a score of + 1.32 on civil liberties cases.
See Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 50 at 55. The correlations
with the + 1.32 score were criminal (-0.194), Charter (+0.005), Aboriginal (+0.011), labour
34 (2009)/7 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Interestingly, Ostberg and Wetstein's study of the Supreme Court of Can-
ada found a different pattern-that ideology was significant in two areas of
criminal law (search and seizure, and right to counsel), less significant in eco-
nomic areas (tax and union cases), and least significant in the two civil rights
and liberties areas they studied (equality and free expression).
9 6
In order to test the relationship between the party of the appointing prime
minister or the Ostberg-Wetstein scores and judicial votes, we ran a set of re-
gressions using the votes coded under the direct method as the dependent vari-
ables.97 We first used dummy variables for each justice (omitting a dummy for
Justice Estey, as he was the median justice in the direct voting overall) in order
to determine whether there was any connection between particular judges and
patterns of decisions. The results showed that four judges had votes that were
significantly different from those of Justice Estey.9" Justice Estey had a mean
liberal voting percentage of 41.6, while the four justices that were significantly
different from Esrey were Justices L'Heureux-Dubd (30.6%), Gonthier (32.6%),
Arbour (53.6%), and Fish (55%). When case type and number of years on the
Court at the time of the decision are controlled, the same four justices continue
to have statistically significant differences in liberal voting records.99
Given that there were some statistical differences in the voting records of
some justices, we then substituted time-invariant, judge-specific variables for
the judge dummy variables (keeping in the controls for case type and years of
(+0.488), tax (+0.02), and all appeals (-0.10). Only the labour correlation is significant (at
the 95% level). The correlation between Ostberg-Wetstein scores and Charter-only cases
(that is, Charter cases that do not involve criminal matters) with an Ostberg-Wetstein score
of + 1.32 for Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 is +0.125 and is not statistically significant.
96. Ostberg & Wetstein, ibid. at 214-16.
97. As the variables appear well-behaved, we ran ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, which
should provide a good indication of the underlying relationship.
98. The coefficients for the four judges (L'Heureux-Dub , Gonthier, Arbour, and Fish) were
significantly different at the 95% level. For these regressions, F(26, 10090)=-4.35, p<0.001,
and R-squared=0.01.
99. We ran an OLS regression with judge dummies (omitting Estey), dummy variables for
Aboriginal cases, labour cases, Charter cases, and tax cases (omitting criminal cases), as well as
a variable reflecting the number of years the particular justice had been on the Court at the
time of the decision. For this regression, F(31, 10085)=5.89 and R-squared=0.02. The
statistically significant coefficients were labour (0.14, p-CO.001), tax (-0.039, p<0.01), and
Justices L'Heureux-Dub (-0.107, p<0.0 1), Gonthier (-0.09, p<0. 0 5), Arbour (0.118,
p<0.05), and Fish (0.137, p<0.05). The constant was 0.399 (p<0.001).
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service on the Court). These new variables were gender, whether the judge was
from Quebec, a set of dummy variables for experience prior to appointment on
the Court (such as whether the judge was on the bench, in academia, or in prac-
tice prior to appointment), and one of the predictors of ideology (i.e., either the
party of the appointing prime minister or the newspaper scores, with Justice
L'Heureux-Dub16 scored at either -2.00 or + 1.32).
In the regression based on the party of the appointing prime minister, the
coefficient on that variable was significant (p<0.001), with the predicted sign,
positive, indicating that a justice appointed by a Liberal prime minister was more
likely to have a higher liberal voting record. This factor did have an appreciable
effect. The coefficient was +0.053, indicating that the party of the appointing
prime minister made on average a 5 per cent difference in liberal voting record.'0 0
The same held true when the regression included the newspaper scores with
Justice L'Heureux-Dub scored at -2.00. The coefficient on the newspaper scores
was statistically significant (p<0.01) and with the predicted positive sign, mean-
ing that a more positive, liberal, newspaper score was related to a more liberal
voting record. The coefficient on the Ostberg-Wetstein scores was +0.015, indi-
cating that a justice with the most extreme liberal Ostberg-Wetstein score of
•-2.00 is 6 per cent more likely to vote liberally across all cases than a justice
with the most extreme conservative Ostberg-Wetstein score of +2.00.01 This
effect seems moderate. A 6 per cent difference in voting is significant, but it re-
quires the most extreme ideological difference possible among justices to generate
such a difference. When the newspaper scores were used with Justice L'Heureux-
Dub6 scored at +1.32, the coefficient on the newspaper score had the predicted
sign, but was no longer statistically significant." 2
These results imply that the political party of the appointing prime minister
and the Ostberg-Wetstein scores are somewhat stronger predictors of the result-
ing overall career voting patterns of the justices than the indirect analysis.
100. For this regression, F(10, 10106)-i 1.54 and R-squared=0.01. The other statistically
significant coefficients were labour (0.143, p<O.001) and Quebec (-0.031, p<0.01), with a
constant of 0.434 (p<0.001).
101. For this regression, F(10, 10106)=9.80 and R-squared=0.01. The constant was 0.481
(p<0.001) and the other statistically significant variables were labour (0.144, p<0.001),
bench (-0.034, p<0.05), and practice (-0.059, p<0.05).
102. For this regression, F(10, 10106)=9.03 and R-squared=0.01. The constant was 0.48
(p<0.001) and the other statistically significant variables were labour (0.144, p<0.001),
practice (-0.06, p<0.05), and Quebec (-0.024, p<0.05).
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One last point to note about the direct method is that Justice L'Heureux-
Dub6 is an outlier, just as she was in the constant version of the indirect method.
Considering together all of the five areas that are coded and analyzed under the
direct method, Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 has the lowest proportion of liberal
votes. This is true even though she has the highest proportioh of votes in favour
of labour unions (which we code as liberal). The fact that she can exhibit such a
strong reversal from one area of law to another suggests that, despite the prima
facie evidence that ideal points are correlated in different areas of the law, there
are some significant issues with the application of a one-dimensional attitudinal
model to the Supreme Court of Canada.
B. CAN JUDGES' FIRST YEAR VOTES BE PREDICTED?
Epstein, Martin, Quinn, and Segal argue that, while an American president may
not be able to predict the voting pattern over a judge's whole career, it may be
possible to predict a judge's voting during his or her first term in office." 3 Even
though the analysis above, assuming that policy preferences were constant over
their careers, showed that there is only a weak relationship between the party of
the appointing prime minister and subsequent voting, this may mask the pre-
dictability of votes early in a justice's career. After all, it seems reasonable to think
that votes would become more predictable the closer in time they are made to
the prediction. Like predicting the weather, it may be easier to forecast the incli-
nations of a judge in the short-term, with longer-term predictions rendered
considerably more dubious.
One way to examine whether a prime minister can predict how a justice
will vote, at least at the beginning of her time on the Court, is to determine the
relationship between her voting in the first year and either the party of the ap-
pointing prime minister or the Ostberg-Wetstein scores. As it turns out, there
is a positive correlation between the party of the prime minister and the mean
liberal voting in the justice's first term. The correlation for all cases is +0.361,
for criminal cases it is +0.405, and for non-criminal Charter cases it is +0.283.
These correlations include those judges whose first term on the Court fell within
the 1982-2004 period. The correlation for criminal cases is significant at the 90
per cent confidence level, while for all cases it is not statistically significant.1 "'
103. Epstein et al., "Political Preferences," supra note 88 at 3.
104. These correlations include all judges whose first term on the Court was within the 1982 to
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The relationship between the Ostberg-Wetstein scores and the liberal vot-
ing percentage over all cases decided by a judge in their first year on the Court
is moderately positive, with a correlation of +0.217.' The relationship between
the Ostberg-Wetstein scores and liberal voting in criminal cases is even more
positive, with a correlation of +0.41."06 These correlations imply that the Ost-
berg-Wetstein scores are able to provide some information on how a judge will
vote in her first year on the Court overall, and even more so in criminal cases
during the first year. A prime minister with such information could have a
moderate ability to predict those votes.
However, the predictive ability that appears in the criminal context during
the first year breaks down for non-criminal Charter cases. This is interesting,
since such cases are the ones that are most likely to attract criticism from those
who complain of judicial law-making, judicial activism, and judicial imposition
of counter-majoritarian social policy." 7 The relationship between the Ostberg-
Wetstein scores and liberal voting appears to be negative in these cases. As it
turns out, the correlation between Charter votes and the Ostberg-Wetstein
scores is -0.337. This finding accords with the Ostberg and Wetstein analysis,
which did- not find a statistically significant relationship between these newspa-
per measures of ideology and liberal voting in equality and free speech cases.1"8
The indirect method yields results for voting in a judge's first year that are
not statistically significant and have the wrong sign-that is, a negative instead of
2004 terms. We also ran OLS regressions with the dependent variable being votes in the first
two years of a justice's time on the Court and the independent variables being the case type
dummies (Charter appeals, criminal appeals, labour appeals, tax appeals, and Aboriginal
rights appeals), years on the Court, experience prior to appointment, gender, whether the
judge was from Quebec, and one of the predictors of ideology. In these regressions, the party
of the appointing prime minister was not significant and nor was the Ostberg-Wetstein score
(with Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 scored at + 1.32). The only ideology predictor that was
significant was the Ostberg-Wetstein score with Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 scored at -2.00,
but, again, the effect was not large (0.03, p<0.05).
105. This correlation uses an Ostberg-Wetstein score of -2.00 for Justice L'Heureux-Dub6. If a
score of+1.32 is used, the correlation is -0.19518, and ifa score of 0 is used, the correlation
is -0.01218.
106. The correlation uses an Ostberg-Wetstein score of -2.00 for Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 and
disregards Justice Sopinka, who only decided one criminal case in his first term.
107. See. e.g. Morton & Knopff, supra note 3.
108. Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 50 at 132 (equality cases), 144
(free speech cases).
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a positive correlation. One explanation may be that the method borrows strength
over time by forward and backward smoothing, so that a judge's subsequent
votes are affecting the ideal point predicted for a judge's first year (though it is
unclear why this would result in negative correlations). Whatever the reason,
the correlation between Ostberg-Wetstein scores and first year ideal points
(using the dynamic Martin-Quinn results reported in Part II.C, above) for all
cases is -0.207, for just criminal appeals is -0.14 1, and for non-criminal appeals
is -0.226. None of the correlations is statistically significant and, again, all three
signs are negative.
C. HOW DO JUDGES' PREFERENCES CHANGE?
As noted in Part II.A, one of the dominant assumptions of the attitudinal model
(as well as the strategic models) is that the preferences of judges do not change
over the course of their careers." 9 The validity of this assumption is important to
the debate surrounding the appointments process. The debaters frequently
assume that prime ministers attempt to appoint justices who support their views
and that a set of appointments by a single prime minister (or ideologically similar
prime ministers) can solidify or "entrench" a particular set of preferences in the
Court. If the political preferences of justices change over time in unpredictable
ways, prime ministers attempting to control the Court in, this way would be de-
luded even if they could have some comfort about the initial preferences of the
judges they appoint to the Court. As Epstein, Martin, Quinn, and Segal note in
the US context, "would Nixon or any other President deem Supreme Court
appointments their 'most important' if ideological drift, even among seemingly
rock-solid conservatives (liberals) were -the norm and not the exception?" ''1 They
argue that presidents would not, unless there was some connection to the iden-
tity of the individual providing electoral, rather than ideological, support."'1
There have been only a few attempts to examine whether the preferences of
individual justices change over time. Two studies in the United States found that
the policy preferences of justices do change, often significantly, over time. Ep-
stein, Hoekstra, Segal, and Spaeth analyzed the voting in civil liberties cases by
109. Epstein et a., "Political Preferences," supra note 88 at 802-04; Epstein et al., "Ideological
Drift," supra note 88 at 1489.
110. Epstein et al., "Ideological Drift," ibid. at 1499.
111. Ibid. at 1499 (pointing to a moderate Republican, Eisenhower, appointing a Catholic
Democrat, Brennan, to the Court in an attempt to gain Catholic votes).
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the sixteen justices who served ten or more terms between 1937 and 1993 (they
examine only justices who began and ended their tenure on the Supreme Court
within this period).112 They found that many judges experienced significant pref-
erence change during their tenure on the bench, although seven exhibited no sig-
nificant change. Similarly, Epstein, Martin, Quinn, and Segal examined twenty-
six judges who sat on the US Supreme Court for ten or more terms, also begin-
ning in 1937, using the indirect method developed by Quinn and Martin." 3
They found that four judges did not exhibit "ideological drift," but, of the rest,
twelve shifted to the left, seven to the right, and three had unique patterns.
Ostberg and Wetstein undertook the only study to examine the issue of
preference change in the Supreme Court of Canada." ' They found that there
is some change in judicial preferences, but that, overall, judges tend to be ideo-
logically, consistent. They compared each judge's proportion of liberal votes in
his or her first two years on the bench with the proportion of liberal votes in
the fifth and sixth years and measured the judge's percentage change. They then
compared that percentage change with the percentage change of other judges who
were also present in both periods. They assumed that when a judge's voting pat-
tern changed relative to that of his or her colleagues, that indicated an ideological
shift. In their study, an ideological shift occurs when a judge's percentage change
in liberal votes differs from that of his or her peers by more than one standard
deviation. As relatively few judges experienced these shifts, they concluded that
judges' ideologies are relatively stable over time. One concern with this approach
is that it takes two discrete time periods as indicative of change without exam-
ining what happened in other periods to see, for example, whether the change
was part of a trend or an anomaly.
To determine how judicial policy preferences have changed over time at
the Supreme Court, it would be necessary to examine the votes in each term for
each judge's time on the Court. The difficulty is how to separate changes in a
justice's preferences over time from other changes, such as changes in the mix
of cases from term to term."' In the United States, Epstein, Hoekstra, Segal,
112. Epstein et al, "Political Preferences," supra note 88.
113. Ibid. See also Martin & Quinn, "Dynamic Ideal," supra note 81 (using the more limited set
of justices examined by Epstein et a!, "Ideological Drift," supra note 88).
114. Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 50.
115. This difficulty was noted in the American context by Epstein etal., "Political Preferences,"
supra note 88 at 810, and by Epstein etal., "Ideological Drift," supra note 88 at 1495-96.
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and Spaeth adjusted each justice's votes using a method adapted from a study
by Baum, resulting in "Baum-adjusted" votes." 6 These adjustments were made
by calculating the percentage change in liberal votes for each continuing justice
(often this is all nine justices serving on the Court in any given term) for con-
secutive terms (e.g., 1985 and 1986) and obtaining the median value of these
percentage changes. They used this median value to obtain the "Baum-adjusted"
votes of each justice by subtracting this median change from the justice's per-
centage of liberal voting in the latter period (1986-1987). They argue that this
adjustment corrects for the issue change-that is, the implicit "liberalness" or
conservativeness" of the legal issues faced by the Court in any given term.
We used this adjustment to determine the change in voting by justices who
served for eight or more terms between 1982 and 2004.117 Our findings from
the Baum-adjusted voting for these justices for each year on the Court indicate
that some justices' voting patterns have changed considerably. Of the eleven jus-
tices, three remained relatively stable (Justices Gonthier, La Forest, and Sopinka),
while three drifted towards more liberal voting (Justices Cory, lacobucci, and
Bastarache); two moved towards more conservative voting (Justices L'Heureux-
Dub6 and Major); and three exhibited mixed changes (Justices Lamer, McLach-
lin, and Binnie).
There is, however, a difficulty with this approach to examining preference
change, as well as with the approach taken by Ostberg and Wetstein. The Baum
method makes assumptions in order to permit measurement of preference change
over time. In particular, it assumes that while justices' preferences may change
from term to term, these changes "net out" on average, such that the median
change is an accurate measure of the change in case mix rather than itself reflect-
ing a change in judicial preferences from one term to the next. " 8 Ostberg and
There may be other reasons why justices' votes.may change over time, including changes
in the composition of the bench. See Lawrence Baum, "Membership Change and
Collective Voting Change in the United States Supreme Court" (1992) 54 J. Pol. 3 at 5.
See Epstein etal., "Ideological Drift," supra note 88 at 816 (changes in public opinion on
issues).
116. See Lawrence Baum, "Measuring Policy Change in the U.S. Supreme Court" (1988) 82 Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 905; Lawrence Baum, "Measuring Policy Change in the Rehnquist Court"
(1995) 23 Am. Pol. Q. 373.
117. Any justice who voted on ten or fewer cases in a given term was omitted.
118. Martin & Quinn, "Dynamic Ideal," supra note 81 at 136 (discussing weaknesses of the
Baum-adjusted measures of preference change).
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TABLE 4: QUALITATIVE RESULTS OF THE DYNAMIC MARTIN-QUINN
No Trend Trending More Trending More
"Liberal" "Conservative"
All Cases (n=502) 8 10 9
Criminal Only (n=256) 9 6 12
Non-Criminal (n=2 4 6) 10 9 8
Wetstein make the even stronger assumption that these preferences do not change
over five or six years on the Court.
Following the Martin-.Quinn approach, we also used the indirect method
to estimate changes in judicial preferences over time."' We calculated the ideal
points for the justices of the Court for the 1982 to 2004 terms in all 502 ap-
peals where the Court split. The analysis was also done for the 246 non-
criminal appeals in which the Court was divided and for the 256 criminal ap-
peals in which the Court was divided. The results were not so materially differ-
ent from those depicted for all cases.
Table 4 suggests that, on a court-wide basis, it is very difficult to see any
systematic pattern of change in judicial preferences over time. Indeed, of the
eighty-one observations, twenty-seven indicate no trend, twenty-five a more
liberal trend, and twenty-nine, a more conservative trend. This is not the stuff
from which strong conclusions can be drawn.
The results do not change much if we separate the Conservative appointees
from the Liberal appointees. Among the Conservative appointees, we have six-
teen observations of appointees trending in a conservative direction, six obser-
vations of no trend, and eleven observations of a liberal trend. Among Liberal
appointees, we have thirteen observations of appointees trending in a conserva-
tive direction, twenty-one observations of no trend, and fourteen observations
of a liberal trend. There is no clear story to be told here of appointees of either
party responding to tenure on the Court in a systematically different way.
The clear story to be told, however, is that justices do in fact shift in their
preferences over the course of their careers, and that it is extremely difficult to
predict the manner in which the justices will shift. Coupled with the results in
119. In each case, the results were obtained using the C++ source code made available for
replication. See ibid. We used 5,100,000 iterations for the Gibbs sampler, the first 100,000
of which were for burn-in.
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Part III.B, the dynamic results suggest that justices may behave in unexpected
ways in their first term and will then shift in unpredictable ways from the initial
voting behaviour.
IV. REFORMING THE APPOINTMENTS PROCESS
There are two main implications of the foregoing analyses. The first is that
the judicial appointments process to the Supreme Court of Canada has not yet
become the ideologically politicized and polarizing process that many of its crit-
ics make it out to be. In fact, the results are somewhat surprising, in that prime
ministers from both parties have appointed individuals to the Court who have
gone on to become notable champions of attitudinal positions that are unlikely
to have been shared by the appointing prime minister. This result may have
been reached despite efforts by prime ministers to do otherwise (by appointing
ideologically compatible judges to the Court). There is some empirical support
for this, as there is a statistically significant difference overall between voting
records of judges appointed by Conservative prime ministers and justices ap-
pointed by Liberal prime ministers.
This being the case, it is not so much that the current appointments process
is in shambles and needs to be rebuilt from the ground up, but rather that the
current appointments process should be strengthened in a manner that will
avoid any potential abuses of the more or less open-ended discretion vested with
the minister of justice and the prime minister to appoint freely any person of
their choosing. Care must be taken not to adopt safeguards that will'engender
a more politicized process. Such safeguards may well result in what we ought
to be consciously attempting to avoid-a politicized, polarized, and acrimoni-
ous appointments process such as that which prevails in the United States.12
120. On this point, Justice Rothstein remarked:
[h]opefully the demeanor of the proceedings I went through will be maintained in the future.
But I think we have more to go on than just hope. We all know the criticism of the United
States Senate confirmation process, and I don't think Canadians want to go there. ... The
objective is accountability, and accounting to the public through a public hearing is useful.
I suppose though, that the elephant in the room is polarization. If in the future our society
becomes more polarized than it is today, might we inexorably end up with a process that was
not intended? The main criticism of the United States Senate Judiciary Committee hearings
is that the process may sometimes have less to do with screening a nominee for his or her
suitability for the job and more to do with seeking commitments about how the nominee
will decide cases in the future. And this can lead to questions that are sometimes personally
invasive, irrelevant, and inappropriate. I do not claim that Canadians are necessarily above
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We return here to the Hippocratic exhortation "to do good, or do no harm."'21
The second main implication of the analyses is that the attitudinal model
of decision making does not apply straightforwardly to the Supreme Court of
Canada. The direct method of analysis points to some connection between pre-
dictors of attitudes and judicial voting, but the connection is, at most, moder-
ate. Further, in a range of areas, the indirect method yields results that are either
clearly wrong or at least suspicious. Most striking of all is the reversal in the
ordinal ranking of the ideal points of justices who joined the Court before 1985
(and the maintenance of the ranking of those who are appointed after 1985)
when Justice L'Heureux-Dub6 is removed from the data set.
These results suggest that something more complex is going on at the Court
that is not being adequately captured in the attitudinal model, particularly as
specified by a one-dimensional item-response theory model. In their recent
analysis of the applicability of the attitudinal model to the Supreme Court of
Canada, Ostberg and Wetstein reach a similar conclusion, arguing that while
"a substantial amount of attitudinal decision making appears in diverse areas of
law in the post-Charter Court, ... the impact of ideology is not as crystal-clear
or as systematic as that found in the US context. ""'
The conclusion that the attitudinal model does not apply directly to the
Supreme Court of Canada ought not to be regarded as a failure. 23 In fact, it
this fray. Indeed, our judicial appointment process has a political overtone. A government
can be expected to want to appoint judges it believes will reflect its ideology, but that does
not mean that we will end up with the negative aspects of the United States' process.
Supra note 7.
121. Supra note 1.
122. Ostberg and Wetstein argue that the differences between Canada and the United States are
related, in part, to "different institutional structures and norms." See Ostberg & Wetstein,
Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 50 at 226.
123. Interestingly, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair recently observed that:
[l]aw and order matters in a way that is more profound than most commentary suggests. It
used to be that progressives were people who wanted an end to prejudice and discrimination
and took the view that, in crime, social causes were paramount. Conservatives thought crime
was a matter of individual responsibility and that campaigns against discrimination were so
much political correctness. Today the public distinguishes clearly between personal lifestyle
issues, where they are liberal, and crime, where they are definitely not. It is what I call the
pro-gay-rights, tough-on-crime position. It confounds traditional left/right views.
Tony Blair, "What I've Learned" The Economist (31 May 2007), online: <http://www.
economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story-id=9257593>. Justice L'Heureux-Dub fits
that description quite nicely.
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points to the need to unravel the differences in attitudinal and non-attitudinal
factors underlying judicial decision making on the highest courts in Canada
and the United States. There are a number of possible ways to account for the
differences in results between the US Supreme Court and its Canadian coun-
terpart.
First, judges may be just as likely to vote in accordance with their political
preferences or attitudes in Canada as the United States, but, as Ostberg and
Wetstein argue, "historical patterns of judicial selection in Canada have en-
sured that justices with diverse characteristics, largely unrelated to their ideo-
logical leanings, have been elevated to the Court.,""' There could be a number
of reasons for such a historical pattern. For example, the principal political
parties in Canada may be less ideologically different than in the United States.
The "brokerage" model has been the dominant model to describe Canadian
politics in the 1980s and early 1990s. 2 ' The principal Canadian political parties
were not seen as dividing clearly along ideological lines on most issues. Instead,
each party attempted to appeal to the same broad cross-section of voters, bro-
kering policies across groups to win elections, rather than advance a particular
ideological agenda. Parties, therefore, are not seen as differing significantly ideo-
logically, at least in the first half of our study.
The principal differences between the political parties, to the extent that
they have been present, have been in the areas of federalism (with Liberals desir-
ing stronger federal powers), bilingualism, and crime (with Conservatives more
supportive of reintroduction of capital punishment). 26 This "brokerage" model
may not, however, be applicable to Canadian politics following the rise of the
Reform/Alliance party in the 1990s, which had its base in more conservative
voters. Reform/Alliance voters were significantly different from Liberal voters in
areas of crime, Quebec, immigration, and a range of social issues (such as gay
marriage, abortion, feminism, and bilingualism)."' They differed most strongly
124. Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 50 at 226.
125. See e.g. Harold D. Clarke etal., "Absent Mandate: Canadian Electoral Politics in an Era of
Restructuring" in Hugh G. Thorburn & Alan Whitehorn, eds., Party Politics in Canada, 8th
ed. (Toronto: Prentice Hall, 2001) 398.
126. See e.g, Keith Archer & Alan Whitehorn, "Opinion Structure Among Party Activists: A
Comparison of New Democrats, Liberals and Conservatives" in Thorburn & Whitehorn,
ibid. 107.
127. Michael Lusztig & J. Matthew Wilson, "A New Right? Moral Issues and Partisan Change in
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from Progressive Conservative voters on social issues.128 The effect of the recent
merger of the Reform and Progressive Conservative parties on an ideological
split between parties is not yet clear.
The murkier ideological differences across parties in Canada as compared
to the United States makes it less likely that broad differences will appear in
judicial appointments, particularly prior to the mid-1990s, though possible also
in the period following the mid-1990s. The categorizations of areas of law used
in the United States and in our study may be too broad to capture the differences
between the parties. It may be that prime ministers appoint Supreme Court
justices who they hope will vote predictably in a narrow, politically salient area
(such as language rights), rather than because a particular judge will vote in a
predictable direction in all cases. Further, the appointments process in Canada
may result in less information about judicial ideology, in which case prime min-
isters may wish to appoint judges sympathetic to their policy positions, but make
greater errors than in the United States.
Second, judges in Canada and the United States may-vote at least partially
strategically (that is, aim to meet their policy preferences but take into account
interactions with others on the Court or in other institutions), but face a different
set of strategic considerations.'29 For example, US studies have found that judicial
voting is influenced by who is on the panel.13 The panel effect may be different
in Canada and the United States if there is a difference in the extent of ideological
difference among justices. Further, these strategic considerations may be different
where, as Ostberg and Wetstein argue, a "pervasive norm of consensus" exists
on the Court in Canada, or the Chief Justices in Canada have the ability to
foster unanimity through panel selection.'
Canada" (2005) 86 Soc. Sci. Q. 109 (finding that Reform/Alliance voters were significantly
different from Liberals in the areas of taxation, Quebec, crime, immigration, and "moral
traditionalism"); William Cross & Lisa Young, "Policy Attitudes of Party Members in
Canada: Evidence of Ideological Politics" (2002) 35 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 859 (finding that
Alliance members were significantly less supportive of strong federal powers and "social
tolerance" issues such as equal rights, feminism, and bilingualism).
128. Lusztig & Wilson, ibid.
129. See e.g. Epstein & Knight, supra note 52 (arguing that judicial voting should be viewed
through a model of strategic decision 'making); Hammond, Bonneau & Sheehan, supra note
52 (presenting a formal model of strategic decision making by judges).
130. Sunstein etal., supra note 49.
131. Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 50 at 226.
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Third, justices on the Supreme Court of Canada and the US Supreme Court
may face, or feel they face, different legal constraints on their decisions. The legal
model of decision making assumes that the "law" acts as an independent factor
influencing how judges vote. It may be that, for example, judges in Canada and
the United States treat precedents differently.132 This connection to prior deci-
sions may influence the path of voting over time by the Court and by particular
justices.
In light of the acrimonious, but not factually well-supported, debate sur-
rounding the appointments process to the Supreme Court of Canada, this article
has attempted to contribute to the empirical analysis of the appointments proc-
ess. It has, at the same time, illustrated the need for a better theory of judicial de-
cision making.133 Each of the attitudinal, legal, and strategic models of judicial
behaviour likely has some element of truth, as do other potential theories, such as
Baum's theory that justices are influenced by the desire for approval from various
"audiences.""13 The difficulty will be in developing models that capture these
different factors and remain empirically testable.
132. For a discussion of the role of precedent and how precedents are treated by judges, see
Thomas G. Hansford & James F. Spriggs II, The Politics of Precedenr on the U.S. Supreme
Court (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006).
133. Ostberg & Wetstein, Attitudinal Decision Making, supra note 50 at 227.
134. Baum, Audiences, supra note 54.
